Quoting Transitional Economic Systems: The Polish–Czech Example (a work by an economic anthropologist), pages 63–5:

The other and more devastating difficulty was the extraordinarily bad weather of 1947: first a destructive winter freeze immobilizing traffic, especially of coal, then spring floods destroying great areas of cropland and tearing down bridges, finally extreme summer drought ruining harvests and fodder and giving a head start to weeds and pests.

The Soviet Union sent in large grain supplies, and famine was averted, but the losses had still been very great and the effect upon the meat and milk supply especially could not soon be made good.

Reconstruction, nevertheless, went forward rapidly in 1947 and it was announced that the industrial portion of the year’s Plan had been fulfilled 103.4%.

[…]

During 1948 both industry and agriculture did better than planned. Industrial production exceeded [the] Plan by some 10%. Agriculture exceeded [the] Plan in all fields except pork production, doing particularly well in the rate of reclamation of idle lands, and in horse and cattle raising in spite of the previous bad years.

Page 105:

The first year of Czechoslovakia’s first Plan was marked by the same catastrophic drought that struck Poland.

Agricultural production for 1947 was down to only about two‐thirds of [the] Plan, in the case of sugar‐beets to half, and, most serious of all, the lack of fodder brought a great slaughter of livestock in the ensuing autumn and winter. (Milk was down to 40% in the latter half of the year, while meat was momentarily abundant.) Famine conditions had to be averted by importation.

The Soviet Union granted a five‐year trade agreement, under the terms of which large amounts of grain and fodder were furnished at once, and Yugoslavia and Rumania also sent large immediate supplies. Subsequently the Soviet Union sent additional amounts.

Altogether Czechoslovakia’s crop and animal losses were estimated at about £125,000,000.

[…]

Soviet Union: 200,000 tons each of grain and fodder, and subsequently another 200,000; Yugoslavia: 300,000 altogether; Roumania: 150,000.

The Destruction and Reconstruction of North Korea, 1950–1960 (a work by an history professor), page 2:

To escape the bombing, entire factories were moved underground, along with schools, hospitals, government offices, and much of the population. Agriculture was devastated, and famine loomed.

Peasants hid underground during the day and came out to farm at night. Destruction of livestock, shortages of seed, farm tools, and fertilizer, and loss of manpower reduced agricultural production to the level of bare subsistence at best.

[…]

By the fall of 1952, there were no effective targets left for U.S. planes to hit. Every significant town, city and industrial area in North Korea had already been bombed.

In the spring of 1953, the Air Force targeted irrigation dams on the Yalu River, both to destroy the North Korean rice crop and to pressure the Chinese, who would have to supply more food aid to the North.

Five reservoirs were hit, flooding thousands of acres of farmland, inundating whole towns and laying waste to the essential food source for millions of North Koreans. Only emergency assistance from China, the USSR, and other socialist countries prevented widespread famine.

(Emphasis added in all cases.)