the russians did not deploy enough troops to ever seize or siege a large population center in northern Ukraine. back of the envelope occupation math suggests 1 soldier for every 1000 civilians. the russians did not deploy that many troops on the entire Ukrainian front. big serge (my milblog goat) goes into more detail here
many news heads have rightly said that this pager (and now radio) attack makes sense only as a direct prelude to invasion, and the zionist entity seems to have wasted this opportunity. i also saw a comment, before the relevation that two hezbollah fighters had discovered the pagers, that “israel” has a tendency to pull the trigger on operations as soon as they are technically feasible. this sort of strategic flailing seems odd, but it also lines up with the conclusions of a US army analysis of the 2006 “israeli”-hezbollah war.
it’s about 60 pages of actual content, and it’s interesting for a number of reasons (there’s a good section on the missiles hezbollah used for people into that). now there’s a two decade sized grain of salt that should be taken here, but i doubt i could get access to current “israeli” planning, let alone in english. the biggest conclusion for recent events is that the zionist entity has focused on counterinsurgency and air power, degrading its combined arms capabilities and doctrine to the point that it does not have them.
specifically, “israel” has fallen for the US air force’s greatest lie - that air power and bombing can stand as a combat arm independently from ground operations. as such, the head of the military at the time was an airman, and the doctrinal changes created were both confusing and biased against ground combat. additionally, the long time focus on ‘counterinsurgency’ in Gaza (the phrasing is not mine) has led to reserve mechanized equipment not being replaced, tank and mechanized crews not being trained, and minimal training at the division or batallion level. the lack of training in large formations and the fact that doctrine became more confusing as the formations got larger led to failure, broadly.
to provide an illustration, i’ll run through the actions of two divisions in the last act of the war. the UN had passed a ceasefire resolution, and for reasons that are not completely clear, “israel” planned a last hurrah offensive. the symbolic goal was the litani river. division 91 of the iof was meant to be driving towards the mediterranean, but stalled out completely. In an inquiry after the war,
The investigation concluded that commanders within the division “did not fully understand their orders” and “were not present with their troops during important battles and even failed to fulfill basic missions.” The investigation also found fault “in the way tactical orders were composed, sometimes without a time element. Since the orders were not clear, they were changed, in some cases, on an hourly basis. Brigade commanders did not properly understand their missions. . . . They didn’t know what their goals were and how long they had to fulfill their missions.” Remarkably, according to the report, “an entire battalion sat in the same location for several days without moving and when the commander finally received orders to push deeper into enemy territory he was confused and failed to fulfill the mission.”
division 162 was looking to take Ghandouriyeh, a town that sat on a crossroads and high ground. they had to cross a valley, Wadi al-Saluki, to get there. first, the general sent air assault elements to secure the high ground over the valley. the air assault successfully landed near two towns, cleared several occupied buildings, did not take the high ground, and then reported that they secured the high ground. 24 tanks were sent up the road, and a collapsed building in front of them and an ied behind them had them trapped. each merkava had a smoke screen to make missile aim harder. dozens of anti-tank missiles then struck the column. not a single tank deployed smoke, and 11 tanks were hit. what infantry that was near was pinned by fire, and tank crew requests for artillery or air support were denied out of fear of friendly fire. the advance stopped at that town.
to me, this paints a clear picture of modern military material (tanks, electronics, aircraft, artillery, and infantry) manned by people who don’t know how to use them. there is no feature of the actions of these divisions where their equipment failed them. moreover, i would expect any competent force with air assault, artillery, and armor elements to be able to seize a lightly defended town 10 kilometers from their border.
so the iof is made up of a large number of uncoordinated small groups, and collectively has little sense of how to put these pieces together. and you might say, “well maybe they fixed some of that in the last twenty years”. i think the fact that modern merkavas have the trophy system answers whether or not that happened. it’s a very cool toy, designed to blow up an oncoming anti-tank missile mid air. strapping sensitive explosives to the front of your tank means that your infantry cannot be anywhere near it. so we see dozens of unaccompanied merkavas and bulldozers parked somewhere that a resistance fighter can run up to, unopposed. we also might see a hot shot intelligence officer cook up some pager plan, report it to his commanding officer, and have it approved without anyone thinking that operations are only effective in sequence and with support.
since 2022, there has been significant tension between the aims of the russian state and its military industry and the central bank. interest rates have been sitting at 18% since 2022 because the bank is run by neoliberal, USamerican educated economists. if the fact that russia’s central bank is serving as an obstacle or neoliberal holdout dooms the russian economy, they have never had a chance and we should have all stayed in our armchairs the whole time. you can spin anything out of anything; that same reuters article says that the current head of the russian imf, who brought russia in in ‘92, is stepping down and being replaced by someone sanctioned by the USA by name. shouldn’t a person who can’t legally enter USamerica have different personal, material interests than someone living in washington?
the US has had the complete control and buy in of every private and public bank in europe after 2009 and quantitative easing. they have been trying to get russia in since 1991. the US economy is based on formalized lying. the tried and true method is relying on powerful regulatory and legal bodies to exploit other countries. you like to point out how the USSR’s purported economic value was cut in half by the switch from gnp to gdp as some example of the awe inspiring abilities of USamerican finance. i think this misses the point that your chosen method of judging economic success grows out of the barrel of a gun. if various compradors hadn’t overthrown the government and gleefully participated in the looting, then the on paper decision to switch accounting methods would have done nothing. the existence of US-influenced economists does not represent subjugation.
the chinese banks complying with the sanctions was an L, i can’t disagree with that. but the USA has been ‘pivoting to Asia’ since 2015? 2014? it was definitely obama + hillary. the tpp fell through, and as it turns out the US has no actual interest in leaving SWANA. the idealized plan is to win and pivot and win and pivot. even the second invasion of iraq was meant to be a quick win before pivoting to war with iran. every single pivot has simply led to overextension. the war on terror has units deployed from central asia to the sahel. the nato-russia war seems set to cook at this pace for years. all of this is happening as the neoliberal hollowing out of the US starts to kill the logistical tail and manpower of the US military. every single service has missed recruiting targets for several years, and i don’t need to explain here how ‘cutting-edge’ US equipment is anything but.
it is in my view also a mistake to refer to a ‘focal point’ of imperialism. there is no oz beyond the red, white, and blue curtain. neocons and liberals and people who couldn’t articulate a view but like money all have different views of iran, china, and russia. there are also disagreements on which to get first and what order. the USA in its arrogance is convinced that it stands astride the world and will conquer all while it can’t complete freedom of navigation operations against a country without a fleet. it will continue to bluster and make announcements as if all is proceeding swimmingly. even in the last ten years, the decline of USamerican influence is palpable. even the screwing of the EU reflects this. if you can get your vassals to obey without force, they are loyal. if you have to force the point (like nordstream), that means they would not have listened otherwise.
i appreciate your perspective comrade, but we have to have hope. and there can be no hope without revolutionary optimism
the line is ‘strikes at the operational depth’ of russia, and the tit for tat response would be russian strikes on staging bases in hungary and romania. kursk and belgorod are not at operational depth for the russian military, even though ukraine has been bombing them. you are very right about atacms being used to strike russia the whole time; jassms are worse/ cheaper missiles, and the move to those suggests the USA is out of missiles or willingness to send them off. i think the US war department made an announcement a few days ago along the lines of “we’ll let ukraine make deep strikes if they can show an actual plan.” this reflects that ukraine is increasingly stuck with terror bombing without an actual plan for victory
a provocative headline and a bit of a negative tone, but an interesting article from strategic culture. just for clarity’s sake, the referenced lavrov announcement was in june.
i think the critique of the ‘fence-sitting’ or ‘playing both sides’ from a (i believe) leftist perspective is worth keeping in mind, especially because the material interest of every country trying to join brics is doing so to play as many sides as they can. diplomats and states are not set out towards de-dollarization or ending hegemony as such, but rather towards what they see as prosperity, peace, etc. i don’t personally see brazil’s venezuelan election comments or india’s military industry as a dagger at the heart of brics+. that said, if brics really is going to be a meaningful international and economic forum for the global south, as many of us hope, they will inevitably have to manage and incorporate countries that want economic relations with the USA, Russia, and China.
the ukrainians haven’t meaningfully damaged the russian fleet, and their success in attacking naval targets is not because of the end of the age of the big boat (though i do agree with you that the age is over). the article you shared said a third of the naval assets in the black sea were destroyed. i can’t say i know every boat that’s been hit, but at one point the ukrainians “nearly destroyed a submarine” and “blew a massive hole in the hull of a destroyer”. both were fully repaired within two or three months. the ukrainians lie about the damage they have done, and the western press repeats it. but you know this, i just feel the need to correct the time article.
i think that ukrainian success in attacking the russian navy is because of three reasons. (1) the ukrainians are indeed the best or second best drone forces in the world, by natural selection if nothing else. they have material and operators that most navies would struggle to deal with. the other best or second best drone force is russia though, which leads into the second reason. (2) naval assets have not been relevant to the war since the rumors of marine landings in odessa way back in ‘22. as such, the russians are not going to put the best electronic warfare or antiair up to protect five tugboats and the black sea anti-smuggling task force. so the russians have no reason to put up much more than the bare minimum, which connects with the third point. (3) the black sea is an active theatre for nato operations. i don’t mean nato “operations” or special forces or trainers. there are regular flights of american (and lapdog) recon drones and awac planes carefully following international boundaries starting in nato bases in romania and turkey. any and all possible toys that the USA sees as too valuable or too fragile for the stupid ukrainians but still worth using against russia are being sent over and under the black sea. they’d be sailing on top it if they could too, because the US has been begging turkiye to let warships in since ‘22. there’s probably no part of russia that ukraine is getting better information on than crimea and the black sea coast.
all this combines with ukraine’s habit of PR-based warfare, and big ticket naval strikes seem to be easy (and yet further evidence of the inevitability of the brutal putler’s defeat). i’m also not sure that the rise of hypersonic missiles means the end of all naval operations. the PLA navy don’t seem to think so. they’re building up a big green water/ coastal defense fleet. in a somewhat similar vein, iran just launched its first aircraft carrier, a design based on a container ship mostly designed for drone launching. modern day fire ships, drones, and missiles are a factor that all discourage concentration of force, but they don’t discourage having force. if there is ever a modern naval war that somehow doesn't go nuclear, i imagine we will see the naval equivalent of russia and ukraine no longer fielding multiple tanks together because concentrated armor columns are just cruise missile bait.
i think you’re spot on about zelensky and the kursk adventure. i wonder who’s got more of thirst for russian blood/ nuclear war, the banderites screaming in his one ear, or the natoists whispering in the other?
i’m not a morocco expert, but that article reminded me of an article naked capitalism posted earlier this month. phosphate mining is critically important as a material industry for morocco. morocco has been engaged in ongoing warfare with and colonization of the western sahara and the sahrawi since 1975. the current king of morocco is the son of the king that started the invasions of the western sahara. one policy of USamerica during “competition” with china for critical resources is securing friendly governments over resources, like the bolivian coup. while that ultimately did not work in bolivia, the broad policy of authoritarian but compliant governments controlling resources is a US trick as old as time.
phosphate will always be relevant for mining and export for fertilizer. what’s interesting to me as armchair people’s secretary for electrification is how much longer phosphate will be relevant in modern batteries. lithium iron phosphate batteries are advantageous, especially for vehicle and utility applications, because iron and phosphate are cheap/ relatively abundant. lithium is not and never will be. there are a number of promising alternatives, both at an academic research level and in different manufacturers’ test cars. as soon as it is industrially viable to switch to nickel batteries or one of the more esoteric other options, everyone will do so. when that happens, the idea of phosphate as a critical material might no longer hold water. i’m sure morocco will be happy anyways to take land they’ve been after for fifty years, but it seems like if that happens it would sour relations with algeria. i’m sure one of our comrades from algeria could say much more about that.
the oldest possible zoomer was roughly 10 for ‘Hope’ round 1. some people have to touch the stove before they know it’s hot. the optimistic takeaway is that there are a lot more leftist resources compared to 15 years ago for them to turn to when kopmala doesn’t actually make policy based on taco jokes
the utilities are squeezing people while they’re still allowed to. after the camp fire (the one that the power company caused and then killed 90 people a few years back in northern california), the state legislature has passed several laws about power companies and wildfires. one of them mandates that utilities offer a flat rate based on income, with the highest tier being $85 a month for households that make more than $180,000 a year. for pretty much everyone, even people with full solar, this will mean the power bill goes down. the plan is still moving through bureaucracy, and it’s scheduled to start in early 2025 (fingers crossed). so long as our power and gas come from organizations with executive boards and benefits packages, they’re going to rip the copper wire out of the wall until their business model collapses.
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